Appendices to a (forthcoming) working paper
The Politics of Chronic Poverty: Towards a Research Agenda
Sam Hickey, IDPM, January 2002
Appendix 1: The political system
Appendix 2: Political assets and agency
Appendix 3: Poverty, citizenship and the sociopolitical contract
These Appendices are taken from a forthcoming working paper entitled 'The Politics of Chronic Poverty: towards a research agenda'. They consist of a series of suggested themes and questions that could be used to investigate how politics relates to the reduction and reproduction of poverty. The entries within each appendix are intended as suggestions for research only - politics needs to be understood within particular contexts and in relation to specific historical and socioeconomic trajectories, and there is no universal toolbox that can be applied in any given situation. However, they should at least provide entry points for more detailed investigations into how politics relates to the causes, characteristics and eradication of chronic poverty.
'Politics' is considered here at a number of levels within the boundaries of the state, and as pertaining to aspects of political science, political sociology, and, to a lesser extent, political economy. Appendix 1 examines the key features of national level political systems. Particular attention is paid to those aspects of the political system that have proven relevance to poverty. Appendix 2 adopts a 'bottom-up' perspective, and looks at the political assets, and the agency, that is required for poor people (amongst others) to influence policy, and politics more broadly, in ways that increase their capacity to accumulate assets and devise sustainable livelihood strategies. Appendix 3 arises from a particular strand within the growing terrain of politics and poverty research, which suggests that poverty and poverty reduction can be conceived of in terms of 'citizenship', as defined within the parameters of a social and political contract between state and citizen in particular contexts.
The themes and variables have been compiled from two types of sources: existing governance and/or democracy indexes, and lessons drawn from wider literature on the links between politics and poverty. The most useful sources have been the International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment [Beetham et al 2002] and Mick Moore's paper on political systems [Moore 2001b]. The IDEA Handbook has a comparative advantage in the field of political assessment frameworks, to the extent that it is based on in-country analyses and expertise (and thus more embedded), engages directly with issues of socio-economic as well as political 'development' and contains extensive lists of sources that can be used to explore each of the suggested themes (including many internet sites).
Appendix 1: The Political System
|
Themes |
Key questions |
Potential links to chronic poverty |
|---|---|---|
|
Authority |
Does the government: Have a monopoly over violence and coercion? |
Conflict; instability; respect for govt will influence citizen mobilisation |
|
Control its borders? |
Illegal trade, migration |
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Levy taxes widely? |
Connection between state and citizens; accountability |
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Do any groups benefit from 'disorder'? |
Does impoverishment suit certain groups? |
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How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society? |
Influences extent to which citizens will pressurise state for pro-poor policy change |
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Geo-strategic and territorial features |
Population size and distribution/density? |
Affects capacity of state to reach people, achieve economies of scale, convert economic resources into human development, pool of human resources to draw on |
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How is policy-making influenced by external actors? (Other governments, regional bodies, aid donors) |
Locate intervention points |
|
|
Internal distribution of power |
Where does authority reside within the political system? (e.g. balance of powers between legislature and executive; role of the military; level of decentralisation) |
Influences accountability, restraint on predatory government |
|
To what extent does legislation originate in the legislature rather than executive? |
Scope for wider representation of interests/ideas; breadth of political debate; control over corruption. |
|
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Does the judiciary have the authority to challenge the executive? |
e.g. social movements have achieved success by targeting courts; land |
|
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Do sub-national levels of government have significant levels of autonomy?
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Complex links between decentralisation and poverty (see below) |
|
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What role do leaders play at different levels of the system? What is their social background? |
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Institutionalisation |
What mode of operation typifies government conduct? (e.g. do institutional or clientelistic imperatives govern the distribution of resources, appointments etc?) |
Influences (mis)use of public resources; shapes political action; scope for reciprocity |
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To what extent is politics and policy-making either informal or routine? |
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What are the procedures for recruitment, promotion, and remuneration of staff? |
State efficiency; access to different groups; reflects contract (Appendix 3) |
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Responsiveness |
How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents? |
Extent to which poor groups can influence politicians. |
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How systematic is consultation with users over service delivery? |
Relevance, appropriateness of services |
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What degree of political priority is given to issues relating to poverty? |
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|
Representation/ Competition |
What is the constituent basis of each of the main parties? (socioeconomic, ethnic, caste, region, urban/rural) |
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To what extent are poor groups represented within the main political parties? |
Strongly informs likelihood of a pro-poor political agenda |
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How accessible are the main parties? |
Informs possibility of broad pro-poor coalitions |
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How broad is the ideological spectrum? |
Room for 'alternative' social projects |
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How is political competition organised? |
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Are their fair electoral laws? |
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Is there a realistic opportunity for opposition parties to gain power through elections? |
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Are any parties interested of taking ownership of a poverty reduction agenda? |
For long-term, cumulative poverty reduction |
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Participation |
What are the main axes of participation/inclusion in system? (e.g. regionality, religion, ethnicity) |
Cross-reference with spatial and social distribution of poverty |
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How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels? |
Women as over-represented among chronically poor |
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How equal is access for all social groups to public office? |
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Resource base |
To what extent does the state depend on its citizenry for its fiscal base? |
Increased responsiveness, social contract (Appendix 3) |
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Is the state heavily dependent on oil/mineral resources? |
Politicians reluctant to lose control of access to resources, linked to military rule, disconnect |
|
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Is the government a recipient of large amounts of aid from multiple donors? |
Aid dependency reduces connection with citizens; donor competition can reduce policy-making coherency |
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Accountability |
To what extent can the government be held to account by (a) other aspects of the system, (b) its citizens? |
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Are different parts of the state apparatus accountable to each other? |
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Constitutionality |
To what degree are the actions of the political executive constrained by law and constitution? |
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How easily can the government amend the constitution to suit its own purposes? |
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Rule of law |
Does the rule of law generally prevail/what are crime levels? |
Impact on economic activity, electoral behaviour, protection of physical assets etc. |
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How reliable, effective and lawful are the police? |
Security as key aspect of poverty |
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How affordable, impartial, and consistent are the courts? |
Can poor protect themselves? |
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Capacity |
How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them? |
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What capacity does the state have to formulate and implement national policy initiatives? |
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Can the state raise, manage and deploy public revenue? |
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Does it have the capacity to monitor socioeconomic trends and activities within its borders? |
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How high is the quality of personnel and organisation in the civil service? |
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How high is the quality of personnel and organisation in the military? |
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Political Elites |
How is poverty conceptualised (e.g. are different categories of the poor identified) and prioritised amongst elite groups? |
Extent of action on poverty; which poor groups targeted and how. |
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What is the character and level of interdependence between elite and poor groups (e.g. exploitative, few links, reciprocity)? |
Extent to which political power relations cause and/or reproduce poverty; constraints on elites |
|
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What are the key modes of economic accumulation employed by elite groups? What resources do they rely on?
|
Poor less likely to be represented where economic and political power is closely entwined |
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Is there a culture/code of reciprocity that could catalyse pro-poor action? |
e.g. nationalist, ethnic, religious, regional obligations |
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In what ways might elites perceive themselves as benefiting from poverty reduction? |
e.g. fear of cholera in C19th European cities generated elite action |
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How do politicians interact with market actors? |
If ec & pol elites are entwined, less scope for 'progressive' politics |
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What is the degree of inter-elite conflict? (e.g. low/medium/high) |
Greater conflict / less cohesion allows other groups access |
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Decentralisation and poverty |
How far do sub-central tiers of government have the powers and resources to carry out their responsibilities? |
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How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair electoral authorisation, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation? |
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Is the ruling party at local level 'owned' by an elite group? Does it represent the interests of poor groups? |
Strongly informs likelihood of a pro-poor political agenda |
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Does the poverty in the decentralised zone result from internal/local or external/national inequalities? |
If local inequalities, then decent. is unlikely to benefit poor. |
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Which groups are best placed to take advantage of resources and decision-making powers that are devolved? |
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